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This paper argues that those that subscribe to “Biocentrism”, specifically the Biocentrism argued for by 
Paul Taylor, ought to adopt “Ontocentrism” instead. Biocentrism, the theory that all and only living 
things are morally considerable, fails to account for important moral differences between living things. It 
cannot justify, without ad-hoc addition, the intuition that a man is worth more than a pig, and a pig is 
worth more than a mouse. It similarly fails to account for the status of larger systems such as 
ecosystems, and lastly it fails to account for the status of non-biological entities and artificial life. 
Ontocentrism, the theory that all existing things, broadly construed, are morally considerable, ought to 
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Deciding what we ought to treat as morally valuable is critical to constructing ethical systems, but so too 
is deciding how much we value different sorts of entities. These problems are taken here to concern 
moral considerability and moral standing, respectively. Moral considerability is a binary matter, 
indicating whether or not an entity ought to be given consideration in moral deliberations. In contrast, 
moral standing is a matter of degree, indicating the relative value or weighting of morally considerable 
entities in ethical judgements. These two matters seem to go together, however: knowing that both 
monkeys and mice are morally considerable is (arguably) only useful if we can also justify our intuitions 
that monkeys hold greater moral standing. Biocentrism, the theory that all and only biological entities 
are morally considerable, has been criticized for its inability to account directly for moral standing, even 
in cases regarding humans. This paper criticizes the responses of Biocentrists to this issue and proposes 
that the problem concerns Biocentrism itself: Biocentrism should be replaced with “Ontocentrism,”  
which holds that all existing things (not just biological entities) are morally considerable, where “things” 
is understood to mean both matter and the various forms it takes. In this context, “to exist” is to be a 
potentially identifiable definite entity or property in the universe which is subject to creation or 
destruction. 
This theory, coupled with a notion of extrinsic value that tracks the effect entities have on each 
other’s value, produces a framework wherein an entity’s moral standing is a function of the numerical 
count of morally considerable entities implicated in its structure. This count is here understood as its 
‘complexity’. In doing so, without positing any ad-hoc additions or pre-baked human privileging, 
Ontocentrism’s framework can answer moral problems ranging from the question of the value of 
humans versus pigs, all the way up to the value of ecosystems, resources, artificial intelligence and 
artificial life. It is informed by the scientific and Darwinian views of the universe, and so will also be 
argued to be the most compatible with modern science. In terms of Reflective Equilibrium, 
Ontocentrism fares better than Biocentrism, and so should be adopted. 
 
0 – Methodology 
 
In what follows I shall go into detail describing some major claims and intuitions that arise in the 
history of Biocentrism and environmental ethics, primarily focusing on Taylor’s influential work. In 
doing so I will draw out several key requirements of a good moral theory, given the arguably legitimate 
intuitions that Taylor and various related schools of thought introduce as considerations integral to 
environmental ethics. Such considerations will be used later to evaluate the suitability of Ontocentrism 
through the method of Reflective Equilibrium. This method shall be appealed to due to the object of this 
paper's connection to the problem of subjectivity in ethics – the problem of selecting a neutral standpoint 
with which to discuss ethics in as objective a manner as possible. With that in mind, I take it that finding 
a neutral ground for positions such as anthropocentrism and biocentrism, is critical. Ultimately, I shall 
argue that the latter half of these important intuitions are not satisfied by Taylor’s Biocentrism but are 
met by Ontocentrism and so Ontocentrism ought to be adopted. Despite Ontocentrism’s greater 
satisfaction of the relevant intuitions, it still falls short of some. This short-fall will be argued to be a 
necessary concession given the other benefits that this theory provides.  
This paper thus argues for Ontocentrism over Biocentrism by appeal to its theoretical virtues as 
opposed to arguing directly for Ontocentrism’s primary axiom: existence is good. This axiom is 
assumed provisionally for the sake of showing that the conclusions it produces are capable of satisfying 
the aforementioned intuitions. Although the issue of axiom selection is not within the scope of this 
paper, it will be touched on briefly as a part of a series of objections at the end of the paper.  
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I – Intuitions Relevant to Environmental Ethics 
 
i - The Intuitions of Biocentrism 
 
This paper mainly targets adherents of Biocentrism: 
 
 Biocentrism: The view that all and only living things are morally considerable. 
 
Biocentrism is popularly attributed to Paul Taylor’s 1981 work “Respect for Nature”. There he 
argues that human privileging cannot be justified since there is no morally relevant difference between 
humans and other living things. Just as racism is bad because there is no morally relevant difference 
between races, anthropocentrism, sentientism, and speciesism are bad because there is no morally 
relevant difference between living things. Not only are all living things morally considerable, but they 
are equally so – they carry the same moral standing. This stance is more specifically known as 
“Biocentric Egalitarianism,” and is grounded in the notion that all living things are equally teleological 
centres of life and so can have things go better or worse for them. In Taylor’s opinion, privileging 
humans would be ad-hoc and arbitrary: while we humans may exhibit rationality and creativity, such 
attributes are important only to humans, and so cannot be arbitrarily privileged (Taylor, 1986, p.96). 
Moreover, Taylor argues that anthropocentrists ought to adopt Biocentrism since it is more consistent 
with contemporary science and a Darwinian understanding of the world - since it is more empirically 
grounded than a theory which requires drawing upon non-natural facts to give humanity a privileged 
position. If we were to give humans a privileged position, it cannot be by appeal to something like the 
divinity of humans, nor the presence of rationality, but rather by appeal to a grounded understanding of 
humanity’s position in the universe, as informed by modern science. Biocentrism takes the facts of 
biology in order to reveal a common thread between living things. Anthropocentrism, by contrast, gives 
humans high moral standing only by arbitrary stipulation. 
We can thus draw from Taylor a few requirements of a good moral theory: 
 
R1 – Non-anthropocentric – A good moral theory cannot start with an unsubstantiated assumption of 
human supremacy. 
 
R2 – Non-arbitrary – Whatever a moral theory picks out as important cannot be arbitrarily chosen due 
to human preference of it. 
 
R3 – Environmental – A good moral theory must respect the value of life by ascribing moral 
considerability to all living things—it must be an “environmental ethics,” in the broadest sense 
of environment. 
 
R4 – Scientifically Informed – A good moral theory must be informed by modern science. 
 
 
ii - The Intuitions Regarding Biosystems 
 
Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethics presents a different school of environmental ethics that takes biotic 
wholes to be the primary bearers of moral considerability. Known as holism, this theory contrasts with 
the individualism found in Taylor’s biocentric egalitarianism: something is wrong or right depending 
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solely on its effect on the biotic whole. A main intuition found here is that an environmental ethics is 
incomplete if it cannot see the forest through the trees - if it cannot properly account for the higher level 
ethical phenomena that occurs at the level of species, of ecosystems, and of the earth itself. To these I 
would add the wholes such as families, institutions, cities, and other higher levels of human 
organization, which are also important when describing the ethical landscape.  
Leopold’s theory was criticized as being ‘ecofascist’ in that it could very easily justify the 
removal of humans on the grounds that humans are detrimental to the biotic whole. Authors such as 
Calicott and Næss have noted these criticisms and have proposed different principles to account for the 
moral considerability of individuals. Particularly, Næss developed a theory known as “Deep Ecology” 
which incorporated the value of wholes and individuals. Næss takes it that individuals ought not to be 
seen as separate entities, but rather as components in a web. By making this move Næss can speak of the 
environment as the extended self of any given individual.  
Calicott, conversely, proposed that certain secondary principles can be added to holism to allow 
for a non-misanthropic theory. Calicott solves the problem by positing that members of venerable or 
personal communities are to be allotted greater standing because such communities produce more 
interests. 
In this paper, however, I shift the conceptual terms away from these arguments between holists 
and individualists. This is due to the specific features and conceptual background of the Ontocentrism 
that I am pursuing, detailed in section II. This Ontocentrism does not quite simply align with 
mereological considerations of parts versus wholes, since the issue for it is the relative scope of 
information needed to describe living systems. It turns out that various levels of systems are treated as 
equal but nested within one another, as more or less dense with morally considerable entities—there is a 
sort of layering or multiplicity of considerations, beyond simply part versus whole. In terms of classic 
arguments between holists and individualists, Ontocentrism would roughly qualify as a sort of aggregate 
individualism. For our purposes here it is best to translate Leopold’s intuition of holism into a 
requirement that we pay attention to life on an overall systems level.  
 
Conceptually translated in this way, we can draw out another reasonable requirement for a good 
environmental theory: 
 
R5 – Biosystems – A good moral theory must make sense of the moral considerability and standing of 
various nested systems such as species and ecosystems (and perhaps cities and nations as well). 
 
iii - The Intuitions Regarding Inequality Among Species 
 
Another vein of problems exists regarding the egalitarianism inherent in biocentrist thinking. 
While Taylor’s version of Biocentrism holds that all biological entities have equal intrinsic value and 
thus equal moral standing, authors such as David Schmidtz have argued that such a Biocentric 
Egalitarianism is inconsistent with the obvious requirement that individual humans have greater moral 
standing than individuals of other species. Further, such an egalitarianism cannot justify our intuition 
that it is better to experiment on a mouse rather than a monkey, given the choice. He refers to this 
blindness towards difference as a lack of respect for nature itself. Authors such as Ferkany, Bognar and 
Brooks have responded to this criticism by suggesting that certain further principles can be introduced, 
such as self-defense, capability based rights, or human preservation to make sense of Biocentric 
Egalitarianism. These further principles take the consequences of biocentric theory and augment them so 
that the theory can cope with the requirement that humans be given their due privilege. Just as holism 
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had the problem of subjugating the individual to the whole, un-modified biocentrism subjugates the 
greater organisms to the lesser. If we are to be consistent with our intuitions that there is something 
about greater forms of life that gives them more moral weight, then we need a theory which can make 
sense of why the food chain itself can be justified.  
Taylor could respond that eating the least complex forms of life kills the fewest lives overall. 
Although he does not actually make this argument himself, the idea is that to eat cows is to create a 
demand for further death in the plant world. This account would work for the most part, if we are to set 
aside the question of why we should promote complex life at all if it requires the most individual deaths. 
What it does not work against, however, is the more specific problem of experimentation. This 
numerical account cannot tell us why, when given the choice, we ought to experiment on a mouse 
instead of a monkey (Bognar 2011). They are equally teleological centres of life in the Biocentric 
Egalitarian view, and so the only way to account for this intuition within the biocentric framework is by 
arbitrary fiat – by the introduction of things like ‘levels’ of sentience, or otherwise by giving varying 
degrees of value to certain capacities. 
It should be noted that there exist flavors of biocentrism that do not attempt to be egalitarian 
(Agar 1995; Attfield 1991; Bognar 2011), but I think such non-egalitarian versions have their own issues 
that may equally apply to egalitarian biocentrism. If egalitarian biocentrism cannot justify the difference 
between species without introducing foreign concepts and principles, then non-egalitarian sorts of 
biocentrism are simply egalitarian biocentrism which has bit the arbitrary bullet (spelling this out in 
detail would require another paper, but see references for support of this point). The key issue here is 
that the principle “Life is Good” cannot, on its own, give grounds for inferring that different types of life 
may have to be treated differently. It may be able to do so given various caveats and secondary 
principles, but these principles are ultimately external additions as opposed to the results of inference 
from that minimal basic centre of value. 
Even Taylor says that we might need to treat cows better because they have some sentience, but 
this is paramount to adding a quality that only humans might value, and cannot, by Taylor’s own 
standards, be given any real priority over the agility of the monkey, or the strength of a tree (1994, 33). 
We may play the game of adding enough carefully chosen properties into our system, such that it all 
works out the way we want it to, but this results in a cluttered and dissonant system, complete with 
unquantifiable abstractions (French 1995, 44; Anderson 1993). 
In other words, if we are to arrive at a position that acknowledges differences and inequality 
between species, there must be some principled basis for this, and it cannot be arbitrary or 
anthropocentric. But, as just mentioned, the critics of Taylor find that his treatment of this issue remains 
arbitrary and perhaps anthropocentric. Taylor’s best response to this problem is to admit that complexity 
may be a way past it—that the more complex an organism is, the higher its standing. However, the claim 
here is that Taylor’s concept of complexity does not escape anthropocentrism. In effect, the 
Ontocentrism proposed below allows for a distinctly non-anthropocentric conception of complexity that 
suggests a way of remedying this sort of problem with Taylor’s biocentrism, by, in effect, finding a very 
different ‘centre’ for complexity measures.  
Thus, to sum up the consideration being driven at here, we can state it as: 
 
R6 – Respects Differences – A good moral theory must be able to explain why humans have a greater 
 moral standing than pigs, why pigs have a greater moral standing than mice, and so on. Although 





iv - The Intuitions Regarding Artificial Life 
 
On a different front, technology now threatens to stretch Biocentrism even further. Some authors 
have suggested that AIs in the future may need to be treated as morally considerable (Anderson, 2013; 
Gunkel, 2014). The reasons given for this vary, but largely it amounts to there being no obvious morally 
significant difference between a human and an AI that is convincingly human. Similarly, there is no 
clear difference between a ‘natural’ organism, and one that is artificial. If we were to hold constant what 
the person or AI do, as far as mental processes and receptivity, it seems unclear how we could justify the 
difference. Moreover, given debates about what morality, if any, we should imprint upon AI, 
establishing an ethical framework which can make sense of the moral considerability of AIs and humans 
on neutral terms is critical. This leads to another requirement: 
 
R7 – Bio-neutral – A good moral theory must not exclude entities from moral considerability just 
because they are not instantiated in a particular way (e.g., just because they are not biological). 
 
v - The Intuitions Regarding Intuitions 
 
Lastly, authors such as John Basl have taken Biocentrism to task over the inconsistency of its 
position regarding non-living objects. In The Death of the Ethic of Life, Basl argues that Biocentrism 
amounts to “Teleocentrism” – the view that all and only things with a teleology are morally 
considerable. Biocentrism is therefore inconsistent, since it should also be committed to the moral 
considerability of artifacts insofar as they can be assigned purposes. In making this argument Basl also 
appeals to some of the above requirements, specifically the requirement of non-arbitrariness. In essence, 
Basl charges Biocentrism with being a misnomer and suggests that, by appeal to Reflective Equilibrium, 
we ought reject Teleocentrism due to some of its unintuitive implications. Thus, we can see another 
requirement in the issue that Basl raises: Our theories must be consistent with themselves and with our 
intuitions. This requirement is often known as the “Method of Equilibrium” and was named so by John 
Rawls (1971). It is this form of argument that John Basl’s book ultimately appeals to. 
 
R8 – Reflective Equilibrium – A good moral theory ought to maximize correspondence between 
intuitions and theoretical claims. It ought to do this with minimal ad-hoc additions or exclusions. 
 
II - Ontocentrism’s History and Structure 
 
i - Ontocentrism’s History 
 
The origins of ontocentric thinking are debatable, as some might want to trace it all the way back 
to Spinoza, if not earlier and elsewhere. For the purposes of this paper, the history of Ontocentrism will 
be treated as largely starting in the 20th century in the work of Wilhelm Ostwald (c.1900) and Norbert 
Weiner (1949). Terrell Ward Bynum refers to this school of thought as “Flourishing Ethics” due to the 
focus placed upon flourishing in spite of entropy. 
Wilhelm Ostwald was a German chemist whose work coincides with debates surrounding the 
relationship of matter to energy. Ostwald was in the camp that said that energy is primary and matter is 
derivative. In taking this energy-centered outlook, Ostwald conceived of a tweak one might make to 
Kant’s categorical imperative. Since everything is energy, and entropy is the greatest villain to organized 














B E G I N N I N G  O F  
T I M E
E A R L Y  
U N I V E R S E






















unnecessarily, or with wanton disregard. Ostwald referred to this principle as the “Energetic 
Imperative”. He further argued that Kant’s imperative was in fact secondary to the energetic imperative 
as the categorical imperative was meant to combat injustice and immorality – frictions in the social 
world. To eliminate such frictions is to eliminate sources of unnecessary entropy.  
Ostwald’s thinking would go largely unremarked for some period of time before being picked up 
once more by Robert Bruce Lindsay who also formulated a version of the Energetic Imperative that he 
calls the Thermodynamic Imperative. Norbert Weiner, a man who some call the father of cybernetics, 
also picked up on this line of thinking around the same time. Besides his many contributions to 
computer science, Wiener also took certain stances on ethics.  
Wiener took it that the greatest natural evil was entropy, and that countering this evil must be 
within the scope of ethics. Bynum states that if we agree with Wiener that entropy is the enemy of all 
things, then we must also agree that “the overall focus of ethics can and should be shifted away from the 
narrow anthropocentric goal of only human flourishing to the broader, and more reasonable, goal of the 
flourishing of life, ecosystems and just civilizations, even well-behaved cybernetic machines that 
participate in the very fabric of those civilizations” (Bynum 2006, 170). 
Stated in other terms, the goal of ethics ought to be maximizing the area under the graph 
describing momentary complexity across time (Fig 1). Under this view, the complexity of existence is 
taken to have increased over time. At the same time, however, it is taken that this organized existence 
will peter off due to the limitations imposed by entropy. Making the most of the potential of the universe 
before it passes is thus the objective.  
 
 
Figure 1 (Produced for this paper) 
Norbert Wiener arguably was the first to create a relatively robust ontocentric framework, but it 
did not garner much attention for some time. It is unclear to what degree ontocentric thinking developed 
following Wiener, but suffice to say it currently takes its most robust form in Luciano Floridi’s 






Floridi’s theory parses value in terms of the information equivalents of objects. Any entity can, 
in principle, be given an informational equivalent that describes the entirety of its complexity at all 
observable levels of abstraction. Although such a task may be daunting if not practically impossible, 
there is a finite amount of information that such a description would entail. For Floridi, this amount of 
information correspondingly determines the amount of moral subjects associated with that entity. He 
calls these informational objects. Informational objects are a universal class of things that have arisen 
out of the chaotic early universe, taking increasingly complex forms. The protection and promotion of 
the flourishing of these entities is what Ontocentrism basically amounts to. As he puts it: “All entities, 
even when interpreted as only clusters of information, still have a minimal moral worth qua information 
objects and so may deserve to be respected” (Floridi 2002). Floridi argues for this point, in part, by 
criticizing the Kantian understanding of intrinsic value on the grounds that it cannot account for moral 
phenomena such as the sanctity of a corpse. This inability, he argues, can be resolved if one allows that 
non-living objects can have moral worth in virtue of their informational nature. Regardless of whether 
this argument succeeds, the key thing being drawn out is that there can be non-living things worthy of 
moral care and respect. 
Despite the elegance of Floridi’s formulation, the form of Ontocentrism that shall be defended 
and utilized here will not rely on previous formulations except in spirit. The form I shall appeal to will 
be detailed in the following section. 
 
ii - Ontocentrism’s Structure 
 
To avoid getting bogged down in the strengths and weaknesses of other ontocentric frameworks, 
I now briefly outline the sort of Ontocentrism I am suggesting here.  
 
Ontocentrism: The view that all existing things, broadly construed, are morally considerable. 
 
Ontocentrism holds that all existing things – all facets of the universe, no matter how big or 
small – are morally considerable. This includes fundamental sub-atomic entities all the way up the 
mereological ladder to bricks, plants, animals, humans, societies, ecosystems, planets, solar systems, and 
so on. The considerability of the individual parts does not equate to the whole in the same way that the 
properties of individual parts needn’t equate to the properties of a whole. Consequently, material mass is 
not the metric for intrinsic value, rather it is the ‘ontological density’ of a thing’s being – its complexity. 
A human is clearly worth more than a boulder thousands of times their mass because the sheer 
amount of intricate systems within humans, as well as the intricate relationships in which people often 
find themselves, put humans far ahead of the boulder which lacks any such interesting characteristics. 
Whatever sort of complexity the boulder has by virtue of its stability as matter, the human would have as 
well in proportion to their mass. What the human would have that the boulder would not, however, is 
further layers of organization above the quantum mechanical and chemical. They would have proteins, 
cells, organs, informational patterns in the brain, and so on. All these things would, by virtue of their 
presence, add to the total complexity that is a human, and to the human’s value over the boulder. 
Thus, Ontocentrism posits that a real analysis of value is not complete until all relevant 
phenomena are accounted for, or at the very least the phenomena which we can in principle identify as 
relevant. The satisfaction of R2 requires that one be non-arbitrary about what phenomena to take as 
morally considerable, and the way Ontocentrism does this is by admitting all detectable phenomena 
without prejudice. As mentioned, to understand the value of a human one must be cognizant of the 
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myriad of phenomena that constitutes a human, and only by virtue of that be justified in assigning the 
human high moral standing. 
The loss of a human, when analyzed only as such, in isolation, is but the tip of the iceberg of 
loss. It is therefore no wonder that such an ‘isolating analysis’ cannot justify the privilege of humans 
over boulders and pigs – why an analysis that fails to satisfy R1 can only trivially satisfy R6. While 
one’s humanity is an important detail not to leave out, it is nevertheless an abstraction, and as such 
cannot be given inherent priority over any other abstracted facet of being. Being human is not just a 
label, but rather it is a myriad of different intricate systems and relationships. Only by realizing that 
within a human there is much to lose may we understand why humans are taken to be of immense value.  
It is important to note, however, that the ontocentric analysis is not complete without the 
assignment of extrinsic value – something to account for the effect of entities on each other. This 
corresponds to the amount of complexity a thing promotes or destroys and would thus be expressed in 
the same units. We can imagine some particular mosquito which will ultimately cause the death of a 
human. The extrinsic value the mosquito has would be negative, corresponding to the loss of the morally 
considerable things that that human is, and would ex hypothesi outweigh its intrinsic value – its own set 
of morally considerable things; as such, the mosquito would either need to be prevented from doing 
harm, or otherwise be destroyed if there is no other option. Coexistence, and thus preservation, is always 
a preferred strategy under the ontocentric framework. Taken in Floridi’s terms: all things, when seen at 
an informational level of abstraction, have at least some minimal but overridable moral considerability. 
Lastly, it must be noted that the primary weakness of Ontocentrism lies in the vast amount of 
empirical phenomenological work that needs to be done in order to put it properly into action. Assigning 
moral standing and extrinsic value can only be as successful as our ability to describe complexity and 
predict events. Thus, an inherent limitation is the sheer complexity of the subject matter. As such, 
pending serious advances in description and prediction, Ontocentrism is saddled with an awareness of its 
own limitations; informed guesses need to be made – rules need to be followed, and more information 
must always be sought.  
 Nevertheless, there are no easy answers we can gain by appealing to simple abstractions; 
instead, meaningful ethical work must be done by diligently attending to the real intricacy found in the 
subject phenomena – intricacy which can and must be discovered by appeal to empirical endeavor. 
Nothing short of a fine-grained analysis of moral standing may do so correctly, and Ontocentrism is 
exactly such an analysis. A further discussion of what such an endeavor would entail can be found in the 
objections section of this paper. 
 
III - Comparing Ontocentrism and Biocentrism 
 
As mentioned above, this paper analyzes a few problems that Biocentrism faces and argues that 
the various tensions can be resolved if one allows their analysis of value to be more neutral – if one 
adopts Ontocentrism. The way the argument proceeds is by assuming Ontocentrism for the sake of 
demonstrating the elegance of its analyses. Consequently, providing an exhaustive defense of 
ontocentric axioms is not within the scope of this paper. If the reader is not already vaguely persuaded 
by Biocentrism, or otherwise takes it that existence itself categorically cannot be intrinsically valuable, 
then this paper will not be much help in persuading them. 
The problems studied in relation to the above requirements are: (I) The Problem of Blunt 
Egalitarianism – R6, (II) The Problem of Complex Wholes – R5, and (III) The Problem of Artificial Life 
and Artifacts - R7. To address these problems, I will show how an ontocentric framework can 
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accommodate the relevant intuitions without running into the contradictions or inadequacies plaguing 
Biocentrism. 
The extremes of human chauvinism and blunt egalitarianism will be avoided in the first section, 
the extremes of ecofascism and radical individualism will be avoided in the second, and the lack of a 
robust structure to account for non-living things will be resolved in the third. Overall, it shall be argued 
that (IV) the various requirements outlined in the context section are satisfied by Ontocentrism, but not 
by Biocentrism, and so Ontocentrism ought to be adopted through Reflective Equilibrium – R8. 
 
i - The Problem of Blunt Egalitarianism 
 
Biocentrism has been charged with being inconsistent with the intuition that a man is worth more 
than a pig, and so on. It has been charged with misanthropy due to the lack of resources it has in 
accounting for the varying moral standing of biological entities. David Schmidtz remarks on this in the 
following way: “Failing to respect what makes living things different is not a way of respecting them. It 
is, instead, a way of being indiscriminate” (2011, 129.) 
Those for and against Biocentrism often disagree on what is morally considerable, but what they 
do often agree on is that something without interests cannot be morally considerable. That is, something 
which isn’t alive needn’t be respected in any way. Unfortunately, it is precisely this extra movement 
towards valuing all existing things, broadly construed, that would settle this debate and make sense of an 
egalitarian ethic that nevertheless makes room for human privileging in our judgements.  
Without a retreat from dealing exclusively with higher level abstractions, such as ‘humanity,’ 
‘sentience’ or ‘life’, we cannot hope to escape the blunt egalitarianism that Biocentrism ultimately 
entails. It is blunt in the sense that the conceptual tool of Biocentrism is not precise enough to get at the 
phenomena it is describing, because it puts all living beings on a par, and thus faces difficulties 
justifying differences between the moral standing of morally considerable entities.  
Thus far I have characterized Taylor’s Biocentrism as monist about intrinsic value. However, 
Taylor, in response to criticisms such as those above, may respond that other things are of intrinsic 
value, such as love or rationality, and these typically are used to justify discriminations in moral 
standing. Although this extra addition may be effective against Schmidtz, it is not effective in evading 
the charge of ad-hoc-ness. It fares no better than other authors’ appeals to self-defense, capability based 
rights, or human preservation (Ferkany, 2011; Bognar, 2011; Brooks, 2011). The positing of these other 
specific values is not an extension of Biocentrism, but rather only a patching of it using foreign 
materials. Taylor himself notes that the privileging of such things would violate R2, and so he rejects 
that any discriminations can ultimately be made.  
The ontocentric analysis that will be given here basically amounts to pointing out that, if you 
grant moral considerability to all things equally, but understand them in the ontocentric framework 
outlined above, humans end up just simply having more morally considerable things within their being. 
This is especially true when we also take in to account human relations to other things, which would 
include love and rationality. 
Thus, without violating R1 or R2, Ontocentrism is capable of satisfying R6. Furthermore, the 
human capacity for creation far outweighs most any individual in the natural world. Consequently, 
although other living things also carry a great intrinsic value, a human is worth more intrinsically and 
extrinsically than individual members of most if not all other species – a human has a greater moral 
standing. This method of analyzing the problem fares better than any biocentric account that appeals to 
something like sheer biomass or individual count – any account that arises directly from Biocentrism 
itself. Such a biocentric attempt at quantification would be committed to the claim that something like 
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whales or fungal supercolonies are the most valuable things in existence. As such, nothing short of a 
general analysis of complexity, and thus existence content, can make sense of the intuitively correct 
privileging of humans over pigs. Once that metric is used, however, an ontocentric framework is 
inevitably the result. To calculate complexity is quite simply to apply an ontocentric framework, and so 
while biocentrists could simply adopt complexity as a tweak, in doing so they become ontocentrists in 
all but name – they take non-living entities into account in their calculus of moral standing.  
 
 
ii - The Problem of Complex Wholes 
 
Another problem for Biocentrism is making the conceptual leap from the individual to the 
greater system of which it is a part, whether that be the species, the ecosystem, the society, or even the 
whole biosphere itself. Mirroring the reply to the problem before, all that is needed to address this 
problem is the valuing of things that do not themselves have interests in any strict sense of the word. I 
say ‘strict sense’ because some, like John Basl, take it that even inanimate objects can have a welfare in 
virtue of their teleology. Furthermore, given the universe’s arguable tendency towards increasing 
complexity, all stable entities might be granted a minimal teleology in virtue of their temporary 
resistance to entropy, but I digress. 
Applying the ontocentric framework can make sense of the status of wholes because it is not 
pinned down to any entity or property centered perspective. It grants moral considerability to any 
structure or property that can be referred to. The whole that is picked out needn’t have any special 
characteristics other than being the potential subject of a reference. Thus, a complex form of life can be 
considered to enjoy greater moral standing than a disorganized pile of the living cells which composed 
it. Moreover, a fortiori, an ecosystem or species understandably has more value than an individual 
component in that web, due to its complexity. 
 The issue, however, becomes complicated due to the greater complexity involved in wholes, and 
as such we are often limited in practical scenarios to only talking of the parts that compose them – the 
parts about which we have a more sturdy understanding. In any case, this ontocentric solution fares 
better than the biocentric solution due to it not being a brute matter of individuals versus collectives, but 
rather a real analysis of what complexity goes into each, and how the health of one can be translated into 
the health of the other. 
 
iii - The Problem of Artificial Life and Artifacts 
 
Another major problem is that Biocentrism is ill equipped to address the moral status of artifacts. 
Not only does the creation of new artificial forms of life create difficulties in the biocentric picture due 
to the way they are compared to existing biological things, but such cases also expose the fact that life 
itself is a problematic thing to define. Indeed, philosophers like Basl have argued that Biocentrism is 
actually just Teleocentrism, and as such extends far beyond the normal limits of biology. Even 
inanimate artifacts can be considered to have a good of their own – a teleology - and as such 
Biocentrism is either incomplete or otherwise confused. John Basl argues that it is confused, and that 
Teleocentrism must be discarded, however his reasoning for this is less than solid.  
The problem in his reasoning seems to arise from only paying attention to the concept of moral 
considerability, without allowing the concept of moral standing to enter the discussion. He posits a few 
conditions of adequacy, such as non-arbitrariness - R2, and Intuitiveness – R8, and suggests that 
Teleocentrism cannot satisfy them while simultaneously excluding artifacts, and so Teleocentrism must 
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be discarded. I aim to show how Ontocentrism does meet Basl’s conditions of adequacy, and certainly 
more so than the competing theories. 
Basl argues that there is no intrinsic obligation to preserve inanimate objects, but simultaneously 
appeals to the intuition that more complex objects are to be granted a greater standing than less complex 
ones. Basl states “I intuitively think we should preserve the computer over the corkscrew, but this is 
only because I recognize the value of computers” (2019, 177), but then moves on without much 
attention being paid to this. Much like the biocentrists in the preceding problems, Basl’s biases, while 
not disagreeable, seem to require an undue amount of ad-hoc addition in order to justify the evaluations 
they imply. Not only this, but a theory which is unable to account for corkscrews will be completely 
unprepared to account for things like strong AI. 
Ontocentrism structurally cannot have such an issue, as all kinds of phenomena are granted 
moral considerability and moral standing in proportion to their complexity. Admittedly, the fact that 
Ontocentrism includes inanimate objects is taken to be a negative by many, however the value ascribed 
to such objects is, as explained above, far outweighed by what we traditionally would be tempted to call 
morally considerable. Moreover, even granting the unintuitiveness of this aspect, I argue that it is a 
necessary concession when taken in Reflective Equilibrium. 
 
iv - Ontocentrism in Reflective Equilibrium 
 
I will now argue that if we carry out the method of Reflective Equilibrium, as Basl does, but we 
take into account a larger set of intuitions, the reasonable move is to adopt Ontocentrism. Basl does not 
take into account moral standing and instead focuses his criticisms on the notion of moral 
considerability. In doing so, he successfully, to my mind, argues that Biocentrism is a misnomer. Had he 
taken into account more of the intuitions at play, however, besides the intuition that things like 
corkscrews and rocks cannot carry a moral status, his analysis might have taken that intuition to be a 
necessary concession. 
In particular, the intuitions that he should have taken into account are the ones mentioned in the 
previous sections. There is a strong intuition that moral considerability is insufficient for environmental 
ethics, and so moral standing must be allowed to vary in certain ways (R5). There exists a strong 
intuition that higher level structures like ecosystems must be taken to be morally considerable due to 
their prominence in practical environmental considerations (R6). Lastly, there exists a strong intuition 
that artificial life ought to be granted moral considerability despite it not being biological (R7). All of 
these intuitions must be made sense of in a way that does not violate the requirements of non-
anthropocentrism (R1), of non-arbitrariness (R2), of being environmental (R3), and of being informed 
(R4). Thus, unless we wish to perform an ad-hoc discounting or accounting of artificial life, ecosystems, 
and degrees of moral standing, we need some theory that can bring all of these issues into an 
equilibrium. 
Ontocentrism achieves all of this because, first and foremost, it is non-arbitrary. The central 
value that it centers upon is not pleasure, happiness, life, or any other property that not all things 
necessarily share, but rather it centers upon existence. Existence is a state that is common to all things, 
and arguably is a more basic teleological goal than life. The universe sifts itself into increasing amounts 
of local order and complexity. Living things do this more, but non-living things also do this by virtue of 
their stability. Thus, existence is taken to be primary due to it being the most basic state that entities in 
the universe may tend towards, barring chaos. Although it is still humans making this theory, in 
satisfying the condition of non-arbitrariness by appeal to good-faith observation, Ontocentrism also 
satisfies the condition of non-anthropocentrism. There is no starting point that hinges on our superiority. 
 12 
 
Despite not taking anthropocentrism as an assumption, however, Ontocentrism manages to 
nevertheless grant humanity a high, if not the highest, amount of moral standing. Moreover, it manages 
to assign moral standing in a way that tracks our various estimates of moral considerability. Since a 
human is more complex than a pig which is more complex than a mouse, moral standing is assigned to 
them in a way that vindicates our intuitive assumptions. Ontocentrism thus succeeds in making sense of 
relative value where biocentric egalitarianism failed. Moreover, Basl’s remark that a computer is more 
valuable than a corkscrew is also made sense of, and furthermore Ontocentrism can deflate his criticism 
that treating such things as though they had equal status to a human is unintuitive. Corkscrews and 
computers do not have equal status because, although they both enjoy moral considerability, they hold 
less moral standing than a human. The corkscrew is not the computer’s equal for the same reason that 
the computer is not the human’s equal. Thus, although we still run into the difficulty of the 
unintuitiveness of including non-living entities in our moral calculations, this unintuitiveness is 
ameliorated by the fact that this does not mean our calculations must now involve giving full human 
rights to corkscrews. All that is required is allowing that such objects have a minimal amount of moral 
standing which is overridable when weighed against the considerability of other greater sets of entities. 
All that is required is that one does not destroy such entities with wanton disregard for the waste. Often 
the human experience garnered is enough to make this calculation, such as in the case of a firework. We 
value the firework not just for the complexity of its making, nor just for the complexity intrinsic to its 
explosion, but rather also with view to the complexity of experience that that explosion causes in the on-
lookers. The explosion itself and the experience are what allow us to justify the loss of the unexploded 
firework.  
This neutrality towards what sorts of entities may count as morally considerable also makes 
quick work of the bio-systems and bio-neutral requirements mentioned above. Since there is no class of 
entities such that a member of that class is inherently better than a member of any other class, there is no 
difficulty in admitting ecosystems and artificial life. We can make sense of their value by pointing to the 
complexity contained within them. Just because something is called an ecosystem or a computer, that 
does not, in of itself, make it any less than something called a human. It is the complexity that these 
referents denote which really fills out the details of their moral standing.  
As an example, we can consider the place of modern AI in all of this. Current AI is not anywhere 
close to matching the complexity of a human, or even a small beetle. Thus, assuming that there is a 
backup to safeguard the extrinsic value of a given AI, it is conceivable that it would be better to delete 
the information of an AI than it is to squish a small beetle. As AI grows in complexity, however, so too 
will it grow in moral standing – in moral value. There may come a time where an AI does match the 
complexity of a dog or a pig, in which case it is incumbent upon us to treat it accordingly. At that point 
it may become a greater moral crime to choose such an animal over an AI. Lastly, if AI ever matches or 
exceeds humans in terms of complexity, then it would seem that AI would be owed the maximum moral 
status, complete with rights. At such levels of complexity, the analysis maxes out the metric and thus 
becomes impossible to calculate. Such an AI would enjoy equal rights to humans for the same reason 
humans enjoy equal rights to each other; there is no existing analysis which can properly deal with the 
magnitudes of value at play, and so one ought to err on the side of caution and respect. In such cases a 
person is forced, quite rightly, into an appeal to egalitarian abstractions. 
In all, Ontocentrism has a framework which is capable of addressing a wide variety ethical issues 
while nevertheless only requiring one foundational assumption; “Existence is Good.” By taking this as 
an axiom, what results is a framework that is simultaneously egalitarian and capable of justifying 
relative value. It is egalitarian in the sense that any facet of the universe, when brought into abstraction, 
is of equal value to any other facet. It is capable of justifying relative value in that any facet of the 
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universe, when not abstracted away from the real complexity it entails, may be compared to the 
complexity entailed by some other facet. In carrying out this comparison one identifies the amount of 
morally considerable entities at play, and so can make a moral decision based on that. This metric can 
equally be applied to ecosystems and artificial life, and thus allows us to make sense of their intuitive 
place in the moral universe. All of this is gained, but what is lost is the notion that non-living things do 
not carry any inherent moral import. This unintuitive feature is a necessary concession however, given 
the balance of things. 
 
 
IV – Objections: Dealing with Ontocentrism’s Skeletons 
 
Ontocentrism is not without its own share of objections and confusions. I shall briefly mention 
here four problems that often arise, give a brief word about how they might be resolved, but then set 
them aside as important issues that require their own treatment. 
 
i - The Charge of Hypocrisy 
 
Firstly, a common objection that is raised is:  
Ontocentrism doesn’t fare much better than Radical Holism in avoiding ecofascism. 
 If the elimination of humanity were required for the benefit of the flourishing of the universe, 
then it seems that humanity would still be disposable. This objection, while important, does not go much 
further than being an objection to consequentialism generally, and so its response will likely mirror the 
debates had in that area. It is a far-fetched scenario to begin with, but, even if it were granted, it could 
not also be the case that people had perfect knowledge of this at the time. Such a judgement would 
require a predictive ability far greater than what is possible. Even when we limit it to the price of one 
human life as opposed to the death of many, we struggle to be able to make such a judgement. On the 
face of it, it would be incumbent upon us to make such a trade, but at the same time such a trade may 
have other implications which could destabilize the highly valuable entity that is humanity. To know for 
certain that such an action would not have farther-reaching consequences would be impossible, and so 
leaning on the institution of best practice – of rights and responsibilities afforded to sufficiently complex 
beings - is what is usually recommended. In essence, the response given here mirrors the one given by 
rule utilitarianism.  
One of the forefathers of ontocentric thinking – Wilhelm Ostwald – believed principles such as 
the categorical imperative to be subcategories of what he called the energetic imperative (c.1900). Since 
social tension is a type of friction, and friction creates inefficiency, then a principle designed to 
eliminate such friction is a good one. Thus, barring an unattainably good reason to believe there will be 
greater overall complexity in the absence of humans, or otherwise some religious belief in the 
malignancy of humanity, there is no reason why Ontocentrism should ever result in ecofascist 
conclusions.  
 
ii - The Charge of Ineffectualness 
 
Another major criticism has to do with the limitations inherent to Ontocentrism. Namely; 
Ontocentrism requires a perfect descriptive and predictive ability in order to be fully 
applied. Such an ability is out of the realm of possibility, at least for now, and so 
therefore Ontocentrism is useless. 
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It is true that Ontocentrism, under ideal conditions, involves an ability to perfectly assign 
intrinsic and extrinsic value. In order for its decisions to fully maximize universal flourishing, its 
decisions must be informed by the true nature and consequences of all things. This, however, does not 
mean that a less informed ethic cannot nevertheless be ontocentric. If we endeavour to assign 
complexity in the most neutral way, and we take heed of our best scientific and sociological predictions, 
ontocentric thinking can still be applied. We know without calculation that there is more to a man than 
there is to a pig and more to a pig than there is to a mouse. With some calculation we can know that 
there is more to a dolphin than there is to a shark, and we can know that there is more to a coral than 
there is to a rock. We know that a species in an ecosystem is not isolatable, but rather that it is a branch 
which holds up various other components in that ecosystem. We can safely assume that its removal will 
be destructive in the same way we can assume that a murderer left uncontested will destroy value in the 
world – a murderer will likely murder. Thus, although we cannot say for certain what chaotic effects our 
actions may have, we can make decisions based on an informed respect for all existing things. The goal 
that humanity arguably strives for is itself enriched by being framed in terms of Ontocentrism. A world 
where humans can have the complex lives we have wrought and where the biological world can flourish 
is one worth having. The answer to which type of being should exist is almost always “Both!” 
 
iii - The Charge of Smuggling in Anthropos 
 
Next, people often criticize Ontocentrism as a failed attempt at escaping Anthropocentrism. 
 Ontocentrism is fundamentally anthropocentric. 
For all its talk about being a purely neutral and thus non-anthropocentric theory, Ontocentrism 
smuggles in the privileging of humans. Not only does it place humans at the very top of the ladder of 
value, but it also passes off human judgements of ontological considerability as being an objective 
account of the complexity and value of things.  
This is certainly a soft spot for Ontocentrism, and the response requires careful consideration of 
what exactly it is that I am proposing. Firstly, the place of humans in the pecking order is by no means 
an intended consequence, but rather simply an accidental consequence. Nothing about Ontocentrism is 
based on the special status of humans, where humanity itself is seen as one way of life – of existence - 
among uncountable equals. The thing that makes humanity have high moral standing is the fact of what 
it entails in terms of other existing things. Humans have many other ways of life and existence contained 
within themselves, within their gut biota, within their brain circuitry, or in the very chemistry of their 
being. Humans are immensely valuable in the same way that a beautiful ecosystem is immensely 
valuable. The fact that we often forget this in both cases does not deny their common beauty. At such 
levels of complexity, and thus moral standing, the risk-reward calculation favors a sort of 
conservationism due to what is at stake. It is for this reason that human intuitions regarding relative 
value and complexity are the best that we have. The goal is to be completely neutral in our attempts to 
pick out all facets of being and this is done by joyfully utilizing the lenses of differing interpretations. It 
is thus assumed that the entities at stake can be discovered by anyone who gives it dutiful attention 
through these lenses. Anything that is left unaccounted for ought to be due to intrinsic human 
limitations, not due to a biased disregard of interpretations, or worse: laziness.  
Despite the difficulties associated with highly complex phenomena, there is room for work to be 
done in assigning complexity values to more basic things. Such an endeavor would require a rigorous 
study of the quantity of potential descriptions any given thing can have. These descriptions, admittedly, 
would be produced by humans. Consequently, the results would have to be controlled for things like 
level of education, culture, occupation and personality – the results would have to control for 
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interpretations. Given this you could produce a single averaged value which could then be compared to 
the value of other moral subjects that have gone through the same process. Assuming a good-faith 
attitude on the part of the participants, the quantity of referents that could be picked out would scale 
along with our intuitions involving complexity. This hypothesis is testable and may even produce basic 
test cases with which we may engage in more exact ethical calculation.  
It is incumbent on us to put in the work of giving proper recognition to all corners of existence. 
While our vision and creativity may fail us, there is no one else around that can correct our mistakes. 
Our good-faith judgements are the best we can hope for given that, almost as a truism, whatever 
judgements we produce will ultimately be our own. As such, maybe Ontocentrism isn’t fully non-
anthropocentric, but it certainly is as far from anthropocentric as any theory can get.  
 
iv - The Charge of Equivocation 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most difficultly, there is an issue that is often brought up regarding 
terminology: 
Ontocentrism plays fast and loose with words like “value” “existence” and 
“complexity”. These are all loaded terms with their own history of definition, but 
Ontocentrism uses them interchangeably. 
 “Existence”, “Complexity”, and “Value” are key concepts in Ontocentrism, and indeed it is a 
common pitfall to use these terms interchangeably. To disentangle them, I will now appeal to a more 
general account of measurement. Specifically, I will map the concepts of the thing being measured, the 
measure being used, and the measurement attained, on to the concepts of existence, complexity, and 
value, respectively. Furthermore, I will discuss some literature in the philosophy of complexity and 
measurement in order to better clarify the concept of complexity in the ontocentric context. 
Ontocentrism’s approach to measurement lies somewhere between the realist and the 
information-theoretic views of measurement. Realism about measurement takes it that there is an 
objective state of the world which measurement attempts to best approximate. The thing being measured 
is out there, but is only imperfectly accessible to us. The measure being used might be arbitrary, just as a 
metre ultimately is, but the ratios produced in the application of this measure are constant. Whether or 
not metres are real, there is a fact about how many metres high a certain tree is.  
The information theoretic approach to measurement takes it that getting a measurement – an 
output – is a matter of applying a measure – an “information machine” – to the thing being measured – 
the input (Finkelstein 1977). What exactly the output is depends on what school of thought one asks. 
While originally the information theoretic approach appealed to analogies between measurement and 
communication, with Shannon and Weaver’s conceptualization of information to mediate, Van Frassen 
has recently forgone this appeal to Shannon information in favor of an appeal to background theory 
(2008). In this, the space of information is occupied by possible states of an object, and to measure is 
simply to locate the object within a subset of that space.  
Thus, to return to the matter at hand, Ontocentrism takes it that the object of analysis in ethics is 
ultimately existence in its many forms – the noumena. The measure that ontocentrism prescribes for 
quantifying existence is complexity. The measurement thus produced by quantifying existence is value, 
and its unit is bytes. Complexity is meant here to be a measure of the ontology of the object, however it 
should be noted that defining and quantifying such structural complexity is an ongoing endeavor with 
many contributors (Antunes & Fortnow 2003; Antunes et al. 2006; Adriaans 2008; Bennet 1988; 
Birkhoff 1950; Gell-Mann, Lloyd 2003; Koppel 1987; Vitányi 2006; Wolpert & Macready 2007).  
 16 
 
As it is understood in this paper, complexity is a measure of description and would be 
theoretically quantifiable in bytes. The more such information, the more complex an entity is taken to 
be. Assuming one takes into account all levels of abstraction, the complexity measure, once applied, 
produces a set of information which is taken to be a best approximation of an entities value. Despite our 
best efforts, nuances may still be left out, but it is important to make this be due to physical limitations 
rather than due to a lack of care.   
That the measurements we obtain in ethics are often crude or entirely estimated does not 
discount the fact that we are ultimately still engaged in estimating value. Whereas Anthropocentrism 
rested upon the assumption of great value in humans, biocentrism rested upon the assumption of great 
value in all living things. Ontocentrism, not content with these vague estimations, takes it that we must 
be more diligent in our measurement of value. To crudely approximate value is to leave one’s position 
unable to account for the ethical phenomena that occurs in the details – in nuance. We must be honest in 
the fact that we are assigning different standing to different living things, and furthermore, in admitting 
this, we must realize that nothing short of a detailed and careful value measurement is acceptable. 
Whereas in the past we could waive such considerations due to the complexity of the subject matter 
relative to our capabilities, our position in the world and our greatly enhanced capacity for information 
processing makes it so we can no longer excuse ourselves of care. We must look closely at the subjects 





To conclude, I have argued that Ontocentrism satisfies the conditions set out by Paul Taylor – 
the conditions he used to argue for his own theory. Furthermore, I have argued that Ontocentrism 
satisfies other conditions that Biocentrism cannot. Ontocentrism is capable of directly making sense of 
relative value, it is capable of incorporating higher level systems into its calculation, and it is 
undisturbed by the advances in technology which may or may not come. Ontocentrism satisfies more 
intuitions at the cost of conceding one unintuitive premise: non-living things are morally considerable. I 
argue that this concession is a reasonable one to make, and thus those who subscribe to Biocentrism 
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